In recent controversies about Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC), the principle of methodological naturalism (MN) has played an important role. In this paper, an often neglected distinction is made between two different conceptions of MN, each with its respective rationale and with a different view on the proper role of MN in science. According to one popular conception, MN is a self-imposed or intrinsic limitation of science, which means that science is simply not equipped to deal with claims of the supernatural (Intrinsic MN or IMN). Alternatively, we will defend MN as a provisory and empirically grounded attitude of scientists, which is justified in virtue of the consistent success of naturalistic explanations and the lack of success of supernatural explanations in the history of science (Provisory MN or PMN). Science does have a bearing on supernatural hypotheses, and its verdict is uniformly negative. We will discuss five arguments that have been proposed in support of IMN: the argument from the definition of science, the argument from lawful regularity, the science stopper argument, the argument from procedural necessity, and the testability argument. We conclude that IMN, because of its philosophical flaws, proves to be an ill-advised strategy to counter the claims of IDC. Evolutionary scientists are on firmer ground if they discard supernatural explanations on purely evidential grounds, instead of ruling them out by philosophical fiat.
Introduction
In the recent debates between evolutionists and proponents of Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC), the principle of methodological naturalism (MN) has been an important battleground. In response to typical creationist accusations about science's alleged metaphysical M. Boudry (B) · S. Blancke · J. Braeckman Department of Philosophy and moral sciences, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, Ghent, Belgium e-mail: maartenboudry@gmail.com bias towards naturalism and materialism, some philosophers and scientists have pointed out that science is naturalistic only on the level of its methodology (MN), but is neutral with respect to metaphysics. The principle MN has itself become the "focal point of intense criticism" (Miller 2009, p. 118 ) by antievolutionists, and there has also been some discussion among philosophers of science about the correct understanding of MN in relation to its metaphysical counterpart (Edis 2002; Forrest 2000; Koperski 2008; Miller 2009; Nelson 1996; Pennock 1999; Plantinga 2001; Richter 2002; Ruse 2005; Shanks 2004; Smith 2001) .
In fact, there is an important divergence of opinion on the rationale of MN and its proper role in science. We will argue that the most widespread view, which conceives of MN as an intrinsic or self-imposed limitation of science, is philosophically indefensible. On that account, it is also an ill-advised strategy to counter the claims of IDC and other forms of creationism 1 . As we have detailed elsewhere (Boudry 2009) 2 , opponents of evolution have exploited the philosophical flaws in this popular presentation of MN to accuse scientists of philosophical prejudice and dogmatism. Alternatively, we will defend MN as a provisory attitude of science based on the successful track record of natural explanations and the miserable track record of supernatural explanations. Supernatural claims do not fall beyond the reach of science; they have simply failed.
Naturalism in Science
In the past, creationists have often taken offence at what they saw as the 'dogma' of naturalism and materialism in science. They complained that the hypothesis of special creation is rejected in favour of evolution by natural selection simply because scientists dogmatically cling to metaphysical naturalism, i.e. the claim that nature is all there is. In this worldview, supernatural forces are dismissed out of hand, and there is only place for blind material forces and processes. For instance, already in 1971 Norman Macbeth wrote: "If a Watchmaker is thus carefully excluded at the beginning, we need not be surprised if no Watchmaker appears at the end. The dice have been loaded against him." (Macbeth 1974, p. 126) According to Duane Gish, the universal acceptance of evolutionary theory has nothing to do with scientific evidence but everything with metaphysical prejudice:
The reason that most scientists accept the theory of evolution is that most scientists are unbelievers, and unbelieving, materialistic men are forced to accept a materialistic, naturalistic explanation for the origin of all living things. (Gish 1973, p. 24) With the advent of IDC, this philosophical argument rose to prominence, as Phillip Johnson made it the central tenet of his influential Darwin on trial (Johnson 1993) . In response to this accusation, many evolutionary scientists and philosophers of science have claimed that creationists misconstrue the nature of naturalism in science. They argue that science is committed to Methodological Naturalism (MN), but not to Ontological/Metaphysical Naturalism (ON). For example Robert Pennock:
